Where State Education Fails: Lucie Simpson
Jack Reacher walks alone. No job, no ID, no last known address. But he never turns down a plea for help. Now a woman tracks him down, because she needs a break with her new job. Her task? Protecting the Vice President of the United States. From someone threatening to kill him.
In this thoroughly revised edition of his bestselling 1999 volume Why Peacekeeping Fails , Dennis Jett explains why peacekeepers today are dying in record numbers while engaged in operations that either are bound to fail or make little contribution to peace. The original book compared a wide range of peacekeeping experiences, including the unsuccessful attempt at peacekeeping in Angola with the successful effort in Mozambique in the early 1990´s, to argue for the importance of peacekeeping and suggest ways to improve its chances for success. Nearly two decades later, the number of UN peacekeepers has risen to 100,000 from 15,000; and yet, after years of expansion, support for peacekeeping seems to be diminishing. This thoroughly revised and updated 20 th anniversary edition-half of which is completely new material-provides a timely update to Jett´s previous volume, examining why the dramatic growth in peacekeeping has occurred, how it is now being used, and why the challenges peacekeepers face cannot be dealt with alone. Also considering the impact of terrorism on both recent and longstanding peacekeeping operations, this book will assess the prospects of peacekeeping in an era in which the United States seems to be withdrawing from the world.
Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions-with no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories. Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? - Are America´s best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson´s breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions? Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at-and understand-the world.
´´Lee Child´s protagonist, Jack Reacher, is a hero in the Dirty Harry style, a man who lives by his own principles. . .Produces a surprising twist when it´s least expected.´´ ( Sunday Telegraph ) Jack Reacher walks alone. No job, no ID, no last known address. But he never turns down a plea for help. Now a woman tracks him down. A woman serving at the very heart of US power. A woman who needs Reacher´s assistance in her new job. Her job? Protecting the Vice-President of the United States. Her problem? Someone wants the VP dead. Although the Jack Reacher novels can be read in any order, Without Fail is 6th in the series.
The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail , James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.